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VENTRILOQUISM 
AND THE VERBAL ICON: 
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR HOGG'S 
"THE CHARTER AND AMERICAN 
THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION"· 
* 
BY RICHARD F. DEVLIN** 
In this brief comment I offer some critical reflections on Professor Hogg's proposed 
approach to Chaner interpretation. I suggest that Professor Hogg's attempt to 
legitimize and constrain judicial review is an exercise in confession and avoidance. 
On the one hand, he admits that "interpretivism" is explanatorily inadequate, yet on 
the other he refuses to accept "non-interpretivism" for he realizes that it has the 
potential to unmask the politics of law. I argue that Hogg's third way - that Chaner 
interpretation should be progressive and purposive - is incapable of bearing the 
legitimizing weight which he requires in that it necessitates ahistoricism, circularity 
and a retreat into textual objectivism. By way of conclusion, I suggest that we must 
abandon the repressive machinations of textual fetishism so that we may honestly 
confront the nexus between law, politics and power. In turn, this will enable us 
to demand of powerholders - including judges - that they use their power for 
democratic rather than mystificatory ends. 
e> Copyright, 1988, Richard F. Devlin. 
**sessional Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
Peter Hogg, Brian Slattery, John D. Whyte, Iain Ramsay, and Allan C. Hutchinson all 
disagreed with earlier versions of this comment. They bear no responsibility for the infelicities 
which remain. 
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jurisprudential discourse are quintessentially political.5 Neo­
Conservative judges and scholars such as Robert Bork,6 William 
Renquist,7 Raoul Berger,8 and Richard Posner9 have launched a 
major broadside against the liberalism of the Warren Court by 
arguing that it is fundamentally undemocratic for non-elected judges 
to make decisions and advance policies which are neither stated nor 
implied in the Constitution. A host of liberals have, in different 
ways, risen as champions of the Court by providing a relegitimation 
either in substance or process, for activism.10 The debate, in its 
most recent manifestation, has concretized in the quest to develop 
, the correct strategy for interpreting the Constitution. Once again, 
law manifests itself as an arena for political and ideological 
struggle.11 
5 One of the main catalysts for the most recent round of debate was the manifestly socio­
political problem of the legitimacy of abortion, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision 
in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
611Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," (1971) 47 Ind. L.J. 1. 
711The Notion of a Living Constitution" (1976) 54 Texas L. Rev. 693. 
8Govemment by Judiciary (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
91'The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial 
Minorities" (1974) Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1. 
10see Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 
1985); God Bless This Honourable Court (New York: Random House, 1985); Ronald Dworkin, 
Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986); Owen Fiss, ''The Supreme Court, 1978 
Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice" (1979) 93 Harvard L.Rev. l.; John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980); Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982); Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
11 R.F. Devlin, ''Tales of Centaurs and Men" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming). 
.,. 
1988] Ventriloquism And Verbal Icon 5 
competence, and democratic theory."19 He suggests that the 
question of the legitimacy of judicial review is less agonizing for 
Canadians than Americans20 and goes almost as far as to suggest 
that it is a non-issue. Hogg advances two reasons in support of his 
argument. First, the Charter incorporates the democratic safety nets 
of sections 1 �nd 33 thereby substantially limiting the undemocratic 
threat posed by the judiciary.21 Although I have several reservations 
about this claim, it is not the main focus of this comment. Second, 
and more important for my purpose, are Hogg's suggestions with 
regard to the importance of the interpretation debate for Canada: 
the judiciary do not have carte blanche; review is legitimate only if 
it is "based exclusively on the words of the constitution"22 which 
should be interpreted in a "progressive" and "purposive" manner. 
This answer, in Hogg's opinion, is sufficient to constrain the judiciary 
and therefore forestall any drift towards the slippery slope of the 
legitimacy of judicial review. Politics and law therefore remain 
autonomous. 
I cannot agree. 
Professor Hogg's seemingly modest article is very cleverly 
constructed. He argues that "non-interpretivism is nonsense; that 
interpretivism is a concept that is useful only in contrast to non­
int_erpretivism; and that both terms can safely be banished from 
Canadian constitutional theory."23 By demonstrating that both 
extremes are absurd, Hogg seeks to carve out a typically Canadian 
middle path. Unfortunately, Professor Hogg does not tell us why he 
deals with non-interpretivism first. Surely it would be more logical 
to deal with the affirmative claims of interpretivism and then 
19Paul Brest, ''The Fundamental Rights Controversy" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1064 . 
20 Hogg, supra, note 2 at 88. 
21 Ibid. at 88-89. 
22Jbid. at 102. 
23 Ibid. at 91. 
r 
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with regard to what the judges say, not what they do. To be blunt, 
even- in the United Kingdom legislative omnicompetence has been 
effectively restricted by a variety of judicial machinations. The 
United Kingdom does recognize an implied Bill of Rights.25 More 
importantly, through clandestine techniques such as canons of 
construction and principles of interpretation, British courts have 
frequently negated collectivist Parliamentary policy in favour of 
individual liberty and private property.26 The politics of statutory 
interpretation are reconstructed and legitimized as innocent and 
neutral linguistic analysis. Furthermore, Hogg's argument ignores the 
changing nature of law in contemporary British society. The vast 
majority of law is no longer in the form of statutes; delegated 
legislation is where the action is, and British courts have had a field 
day striking down administrative decisions as contrary to the 
"principles of natural justice"27 and, even more expansively, 
"fairness. "28 
Professor Hogg perceives bills/charters of rights as essentially 
constraining of judicial activity - they adumbrate the legitimate limits 
25 See for example, Lord Lloyd, Hansard, Vol. 396, cols. 1322-1324 (November 29th, 
1978). In Somerset v. Stewart (1772), Lofft 1, 499, Lord Mansfield established that slavery was 
inconsistent with English law. 
26see J. Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. l; Harry 
Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. l; Patrick McAuslan, 
"Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 M.L.R. l; for a 
more applied example of juridico�political preference, see Patrick McAuslan, "The Ideologies 
of Planning Caw" (1979) 2 Urban L. & Pol'y 1. 
27Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
c. 5. 
28Martin Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative La� 
Theory" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 215. 
More specifically, how does Hogg account for the preferences and inconsistencies 
manifested by leading British decisions such as Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578, Prescott 
v. Binningham Corporation [1955] Ch.210 (CA), Education Secretary v. Tameside Metropolitan 
Borough Council [1976] 3 W.L.R. 641, Norwich C.C. v. Secretary of State for the Environment 
[1982] 1 All E.R. 737 3W.L.R. 641, Bromley L.B.C. v G.L.C. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 (HL), R v. 
London Transport Ex,ecutive, a parte G.L.C. [1983] 2 All E.R. 262, the "Son of Bromley" case: 
Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council [1983] Q.B. 962, Wheeler v. Leicester City Council 
[1985] 3 W.L.R. 335 (HL). 
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empowering, not constraining. Is the Constitution to be interpreted 
as a rigid and hard red oak, or as a flexible willow? The metaphor 
increases rather than delimits the horizons of judicial discretion. 
Moreover, it soon breaks down, for the language of the Constitution, 
unlike a tree, is not necessarily "natural"; language is socially 
constructed, "fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at 
a certain time."32 What appears "natural" in constitutional 
interpretation is no more than a ,question of historically contingent, 
conventional wisdom, a matter of choice, persuasion and/or power, 
not the product of an oracular text. 
That Hogg has faith in the constraining power of such a text 
becomes apparent when we re'cognize the terms of his constitutional 
discourse. A key word upon which his theory turns, is "apply." For 
example, in the course of his reworking of the doctrine of "framers 
intent" so that it can reinforce his theory of "progressive 
interpretation," he claims that: 
... it is at least equally plausible to attribute a quite different interpretive intent to 
the framers ... that they were content to leave the detailed application of the 
constitution to the courts of the future; that they were content that the process of 
adjudication would apply the text in ways that could not be anticipated at the time 
of drafting.33 
Or again, 
The doctrine of progressive interpretation is ... faithful to the constitutional text ... 
based on the words of the constitution.... If general language is apt to apply to a 
set of modern-day facts, then the doctrine of stipulates that the language should be 
so applied.34 
Hogg is indulging in the reification of language, infusing it 
with a sanctity it does not possess, imposing upon it a burden which 
it cannot bear. He negates its polysemantic and heterogeneous 
32T. Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1983) at 11. Some would go much further and argue that everything we "know" is 
socially constructed. Gary Peller argues that even the idea of a "tree" is not natural, but part 
of a broader, contingent epistemological framework. ''The Metaphysics of American Law" 
(1985) 73 Calif. L.Rev. 1151 at 1160-1170. 
33 Hogg, supra, note 2 at 96 
34 Ibid. at 101. 
r 
,_ 
r 
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of the constitutional text.38 The ideal of a determinative text is a 
chimera, and we are inevitably compelled to recognize that law, like 
politics, is a matter of conviction and (rhetorical) power.39 
At this point a brief example will help. In the pre-Charter 
era, in theory, the Constitution Act, 1867'0 provided for the division 
of powers within a federal state. Was this text determinative? 
Could it provide correct, non-political, purely legal-constitutional 
answers to social problems? A brief review of the criminal law 
power suggests not. Section 91(27) provides that the federal 
government is to have exclusive central control over criminal law. 
What would have been the effect of applying the living tree doctrine 
to this power? If taken seriously, it would probably have meant the 
end of many, perhaps most, areas of provincial autonomy. But other 
factors - primarily political - intervened to counterbalance this 
interpretative dynamic and preserve the identity of the provinces. 
Various sections of section 92 have been interpreted to curtail 
federal hegemony in this realm. Thus the contradictions between 
cases such as McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors41 and R. v. 
Westend01p42 can be explained, in large part, by the political desires 
of the judiciary to refashion the constitution in order to give effect 
to their preferred political vision. It is no secret that many of 
Laskin C.J.'s decisions clearly reflect his federalist bias.43 By the 
38Moreover, there are homologies between this "contemporary eyes" position and the 
anachronistic "ordinary language" philosophers of the Oxford School. 
391 should perhaps point out that I do not advocate "hermeneutical anarchy," that 
everything is up for grabs. There are constraints but they are to be located within the self­
imposed myopia of the community of interpreters (lawyers) which, in turn, is dependent upon 
their cultural context. Meaning is context bound but that context is potentially boundless. 
(Katerina Clark & Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 
1984) at 218-219). The constraints are political and sociological, not legal. 
570. 
40constitution Act 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. 
41 (1978) 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 128, 36 A.P.R. 128, 19 N.R. 
42 (1983) 1 S.C.R. 43, (1983) 2 W.W.R. 386, 23 Alta L.R. (2d) 289, 32 C.R. (3d) 97, 2 
C.C.C. (3d) 330, 46 N.R. 30, 41 AR. 306. 
43Katherine Swinton, "Bora Laskin and Federalism" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 353. 
,-
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On further reflection, Hogg's reference to Hunter v. 
Southam47 only adds fuel to the funeral pyre for apolitical 
interpretation. He uses this case to suggest that "purpose" helps add 
flesh to the necessarily vague words of the Charter. He documents 
how the court considered the protection of privacy to be the 
purpose of section 8 a_nd this enabled them to determine the 
meaning of unreasonable, and then concludes that "all this was 
drawn from the single word 'unreasonable'."48 Once again, we are 
involved in language games; the interpretation of section 8 
articulated by the court in Hunter v. Southam is not drawn from but 
rather imputed to the word "unreasonable." These slippery words do 
not limit the judiciary, rather they provide them with supplementary 
creative artillery to make political decisions in the guise of legal 
deductionism. It is the judiciary who decide what the purpose of the 
text means, they impute this meaning to the text and, supposedly, we 
have the determinative legal answer. In short, purposes are as 
manifestly indeterminate as the text: it all depends upon which level 
of generality or abstraction the court chooses to articulate that 
purpose. The approach is circular and self-fulfilling; the answers are 
hidden in the questions asked.49 I agree with Professor Hogg when 
he claims that "the ruling does not seem to go beyond the realm of 
interpretation"50 but in view of the constitutively creative and 
voluntaristic nature of interpretation, this is probably not the sort of 
argument he wishes to make.51 
47 (1984), 11 D,L,R. (4th) 641, [1984) 6 W.W.R. 577. 
48 Hogg, supra, note 2 at 104. 
49Professor Peck makes a similar point on a grander scale when he suggests that in 
articulating what s.1 might mean the courts have provided themselves with even broader 
resources with which to work. 'The Developing Analytical Framework For Decision-making 
Under The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
SOHogg, supra, note 2 at 104. 
51 In an excellent example of critical public law theory, Andrew Petter scratches the 
surface of judicial discourse in Hunter v. Southam to articulate the unexpressed assumptions 
and "taken for granted" animating the psyche of the court. See, "The Politics of The Charter" 
(1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473. 
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arguments has demonstrated that the text is inconclusive and can be 
interpreted either way, depending upon which canons of 
interpretation are adopted or which other sections of the Charter are 
read in conjunction with section 32. Moreover, the lower courts 
have provided conflicting decisions54 and the Supreme Court appears 
to be thoroughly confused.55 This lack of consensus negates Hogg's 
suggestion that we adopt the approach "which seems natural to 
contemporary eyes." 
Perhaps the principles of progressive and purposive 
interpretation can provide greater elucidation. One version of a 
progressive argument might be that section 32 should apply to the 
private realm because it is clear from Canadian history that the 
greatest threat t.o our rights and freedoms comes not from the state, 
but from private centres of power.56 Moreover, as Slattery 
demonstrates, there are even Canadian and Commonwealth 
precedents for such an extensive approach.57 Yet such an approach 
conflicts with Hogg's own interpretation of section 32, as expressed 
elsewhere,58 where he categorically states that "The Charter of Rights 
.. . does not regulate the relations between private persons and 
private persons. Private action is therefore excluded from the 
application of the Charter."59 Unfortunately, his reasons for such a 
restrictive interpretation are of little help. First, Hogg draws upon 
at 145. 
54Re Klein and L.S. U.C. (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Blainey v. Ontario 
Hockey Association (1985), (1986] 52 O.R. (2d) 225, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 599, Steele J.; Re 
Edmonton Journal and A.G.-for Alberta (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 59, 4 C.R.R. 296 (Alta. Q.B.); 
R v. Lerke (1984), 13 C.C.C. 515, 11 C.R.R. 1 (Alta. Q.8.). 
55rn Operation Dismantle, Dickson CJ., obiter, in reference to s.52 indicated that the 
Charter might apply to the private realm, supra, note 14 at 459-60 but in Dolphin Delivery, 
supra note 15, McIntyre J. suggested diverse and perhaps contradictory opinions. 
56see Devlin, supra, note 11; R. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude -- the Jurisprudence 
of the Charter: Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 321, at 347. 
57 Supra, note 53 at 159-60. 
58constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 674-678. 
59Jbid. at 674. 
.. 
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VI 
Professor Hogg's paper attempts to guide our response and 
that of the courts to the challenge of Charter interpretation. He has 
attempted to answer the problem by developing an autochthonous, 
culturally specific response that does not simply regurgitate one of 
the "remedies" articulated by our southern peers. Unfortunately, his 
proposals come perilously close to simply defining the problem out 
of existence, to espousing jurisprudential closure. His central claim 
is that the text, in and of itself, is capable of providing adequate 
guidance to the judiciary so as to inhibit them from indulging in 
arbitrary decision-making. My critique has been that he has failed to 
develop the concept of constitutional text sufficiently to enable it to 
support the constraining burden which he imposes upon it. 
Affirmatively, I have posited the open-ended, promiscuous, and 
perennially pregnant nature of the constitutional text, and suggested 
the political machinations inherent in the deceptively innocent 
interpretation. In short, it is suggested that the distinction between 
adjudication and legislation is problematic and that the choices made 
by the judiciary are, in effect, the same as those made by the 
legislature. 60 
This comment is written with the (perhaps irrational) belief 
that rational discourse can make a difference. I suggest that we 
abandon the repressive61 and mystificatory potential of textual 
fetishism which allows power to pose as truth; that we understand 
60M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in 
Deconstruction" (1983) 36 Stan. L.Rev. 623. 
61 What Marcuse says about one-dimensional language is rather apt for contemporary 
jurisprudential discourse: 
The word becomes a cliche, and as a cliche governs speech or writing; the 
communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning ... [T]he noun 
governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence 
becomes a declaration to be accepted - it repels demonstration, qualification, 
negation of its codified meaning ... [T]his language which constantly imposes images 
,. militates against the development and expression of concepts. In its immediacy and 
directness it impedes conceptual thinking, thus it impedes thinking. 
One Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) at 184. 
